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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Petitioner,

:

v.

:

MARK RAYMOND DASTRUP,

:

Defendant/Respondent.

Case No.

Priority No. 13

:

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
QUESTION PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Was the court of appeals correct in holding that State v.
Hoff, 814 P.2d 1119 (Utah 1991), mandated that, when it accepts a
guilty plea as knowing and voluntary, "the trial court must base
its findings solely on the colloquy [between the trial court and
the defendant], without considering any statements made in the
affidavit?"

State v. Dastrup. 170 Utah Adv. Rep. 48, 49 (Utah

App. September 27, 1991).
OPINION BELOW
The court of appeals' opinion sought to be reviewed is State
v. Dastrup, 170 Utah Adv. Rep. 48 (Utah App. September 27, 1991),
(a copy of which is attached hereto as Addendum A ) .
JURISDICTION OF THIS COURT
The decision in this case was issued on September 27, 1991.
The state timely filed requests for a stay of the remittitur and
for an extension of time in which to file this petition, which
requests were granted.

This Court has jurisdiction to consider

this petition under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(a) (Supp. 1991).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
Utah Code Ann. § 77-35-ll(e) (Supp. 1988) (amended
1989, repealed eff. July 1, 1990J.1
(e) The court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty or
no contest and shall not accept such a plea until the
court has made the findings:
(1) That if the defendant is not
represented by counsel he has knowingly
waived his right to counsel and does not
desire counsel;
(2) That the plea is voluntarily made;
(3) That the defendant knows he has rights
against compulsory self-incrimination, to a
jury trial and to confront and crossexamine in open court the witnesses against
him, and that by entering the plea he
waives all of those rights;
(4) That the defendant understands the
nature and elements of the offense to which
he is entering the plea; that upon trial the
prosecution would have the burden of proving
each of those elements beyond a reasonable
doubt; and that the plea is an admission of
all those elements;
(5) That the defendant knows the minimum
and maximum sentence that may be imposed upon
him for each offense to which a plea is
entered, including the possibility of the
imposition of consecutive sentences; and
(6) Whether the tendered plea is a result
of a prior plea discussion and plea agreement
and if so, what agreement has been reached.
If it appears that the prosecuting
attorney or any other party has agreed to
request or recommend the acceptance of a plea
to a lesser included offense, or the
1

Effective April 24, 1989, former rule 11(e) was
redesignated as rule 11(5).
-2-

dismissal of other charges, the same shall be
approved by the court. If recommendations as
to sentence are allowed by the court, the
court shall advise the defendant personally
that any recommendation as to sentence is not
binding on the court.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On March 7, 1989, defendant was charged with 106 counts of
forgery and theft (R. 1-28).

The same day an amended information

was filed charging defendant with ten counts of forgery, all
second degree felonies, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-501
(1990), seven counts of theft, all second degree felonies, in
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (1990), and one count of
theft, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §
76-6-404 (1990) (R. 39-44).

On March 8, 1989, defendant pleaded

guilty to all 18 counts (transcript of arraignment proceeding
[hereinafter "T." ] 11-15).

Defendant was sentenced to serve a

term of not less than 1 year nor more than 15 years at the Utah
State Prison on each of the second degree felony counts, and a
term not to exceed 5 years in the Utah State Prison on the third
degree felony theft count, all sentences to be served
concurrently (transcript of sentencing proceeding [hereinafter
"T.A."] 18-19).
On August 1, 1989, defendant filed a request for withdrawal
of guilty plea (R. 61-63).

A hearing on defendant's motion was

held February 7, 1990, and the trial court denied the motion on
that date (transcript of hearing on motion to withdraw guilty
plea [hereinafter "T.B."] 8). Defendant filed his notice of
appeal on March 8, 1990 (R. 104-105).
3

On appeal, the court of

appeals reversed, holding that the plea was defective because the
trial court failed to follow the requirements for the entry of a
guilty plea, as set forth in State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309
(Utah 1987) and Hoff.

Dastrup, 170 Utah Adv Rep. at 49.

The facts pertinent to the resolution of this case are
accurately set forth in the court of appeals' decision, 170 Utah
Adv. Rep. at 48, with the following additions.

At defendant's

arraignment proceeding the trial court asked defendant his age,
educational level and ability to read and write the English
language (T. 3); whether defendant was under the influence of
alcohol or narcotics or was suffering from any mental illness (T.
4); and whether defendant had any questions as to his
constitutional rights enumerated by the court, including the
right to representation by counsel, the right to a speedy trial
by an impartial jury, the right of confrontation and cross
examination, the right against compulsory self-incrimination, the
right to obtain witnesses in his defense, the right to a
unanimous verdict by tne jury in order to secure a conviction,
and the right to appeal (T. 5-6). In addition, the trial judge
questioned defendant as to whether the plea was made absent
threats or promises (T. 7); whether defendant actually committed
the forgeries and thefts set out in the amended information (T.
9-10); and whether defendant understood that the court, and not
the attorneys, determined the penalty that would be assessed (T.
10).

The trial court informed defendant of the minimum and

maximum penalties that could be imposed (T. 4-5). The court was
-4-

also made aware that the plea had been negotiated and
specifically stated that it would not accept the plea unless
defendant admitted that he had actually committed the crimes as
set forth in the amended information (T. 9). Defendant, when
asked by the court if he wanted the court to accept the plea
bargain, responded affirmatively (Id,).
After defendant had responded to the questions to the
satisfaction of the trial court, defendant signed an affidavit in
support of his plea and entered guilty pleas to all 18 counts in
the amended information (T. 9, 11-15) (a copy of defendant's
affidavit is attached hereto as Addendum B).

The trial court

specifically found that defendant was advised of his
constitutional rights and that defendant had made a voluntary and
intelligent plea (T. 11).
ARGUMENT
THE COURT OF APPEALS TOO BROADLY INTERPRETED
GIBBONS AND HOFF TO MANDATE THAT A REVIEWING
COURT ONLY CONSIDER THE COLLOQUY BETWEEN A
DEFENDANT AND THE TRIAL COURT PRIOR TO THE
ENTRY OF A GUILTY PLEA IN DETERMINING THE
VALIDITY OF SUCH A PLEA.
In reversing the trial court's denial of defendant's
motion to withdraw his guilty plea, the court of appeals found
that the trial court, during its oral colloquy with defendant,
had apprised him of his constitutional rights enumerated in rule
11(5), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure.

Dastrup, 170 Utah Adv.

Rep. at 48. Those rights included the right to representation by
counsel, the right to a speedy trial by an impartial jury, the
right of confrontation and cross examination, the right against
compulsory self-incrimination, the right to obtain witnesses in
-5-

his defense, the right to a unanimous verdict by the jury in
order to secure a conviction and the right to appeal (T. 5-6).
However, the trial court had not informed defendant on the record
that by entering a guilty plea he was waiving those rights.
Dastrup, 170 Utah Adv. Rep. at 49.
The court of appeals, relying on Hoff's interpretation
of State v. Gibbons, found the plea defective even though the
affidavit executed in open court at the time defendant entered
his plea "clearly and unequivocally statefd] that the defendant
ha[d] knowingly waived his constitutional rights." Dastrup, 170
Utah Adv. Rep. at 49.

In so holding, the court noted that

"[a]lthough the better approach may be to consider the colloquy
and the affidavit in unison since both constitute evidence
properly before the court, the supreme court has precluded us
from taking such an approach."

Ijd.2 In support of its holding,

the court relied on the following language from Hoff:
The rule announced in Gibbons was intended to ensure
that the record demonstrates that the judge who takes
the plea personally establishes that a defendant's
guilty plea is truly knowing and voluntary. To that
end, Gibbons requires that at the time a guilty plea is
entered the judge should establish on the record that
the defendant knowingly waived his or her

2

Prior to Dastrup, the court of appeals had recently held
in both State v. Smith, 812 P.2d 470, 477 (Utah App.), petition
for cert, filed, 167 Utah Adv. Rep. 25 (Utah 1991), and State v.
Truiillo-Martinez, 162 Utah Adv. Rep. 64 (Utah App.), petition
for cert, filed, 171 Utah Adv. Rep. 67 (Utah 1991), that a trial
court could consider both the colloquy and the affidavit in
determining whether a defendant's plea was being entered in
strict compliance with rule 11. The rationale for those holdings
is well articulated by Judge Russon's concurrence in Dastrup, 170
Utah Adv. Rep at 49-52 (Russon, J., concurring).
-6-

constitutional rights and understood the
elements of the crime.
Hoff, 814 P.2d at 1122 (emphasis added).

See Dastrup, 170 Utah

Adv. Rep. at 48-49.
This Court's focus in both Gibbons and Hoff remained
consistent with both its own and the United States Supreme
Court's precedent, that the trial court ensure that a defendant
enter a "knowing and voluntary" plea.

See, e.g., Bovkin v.

Alabama, 395 P.2d 238, 242 (1968); State v. Copeland, 765 P.2d
1266, 1273 (Utah 1988).

This Court's insistence that a trial

court strictly comply with rule 11 requirements in accepting a
guilty plea is wholly consistent with that focus. Neither
Gibbons nor Hoff rejected the use of an affidavit in the taking
of a guilty plea.

Those cases only required that the affidavit

not be the "end point" in the taking of a plea and that it be
reviewed on the record by the trial court before the acceptance
of a plea.

Gibbons, 740 P.2d at 1313-14; Hoff, 814 P.2d at 1122.

By interpreting Gibbons and Hoff to require a "rote recitation of
all the Rule 11 elements in the colloquy, without regard to
whether they are specified in the affidavit," the court of
appeals erroneously felt compelled to reject the much better and
more thorough process of "us[ing an affidavit] in concert with a
thorough colloquy with includes questions as to [a] defendant's
understanding of his affidavit."

Dastrup, 170 Utah Adv. Rep. at

52 (Russon, J., concurring); State v. Smith, 812 P.2d 470, 477
(Utah App.), petition for

cert, filed, 167 Utah Adv. Rep. 25

(Utah 1991) and State v. Truiillo-Martinez, 162 Utah Adv. Rep. 64
(Utah App.), petition for cert, filed, 171 Utah Adv. Rep. 67
-7-

(1991).
The instant case presents an example of a plea accepted
by the trial court after a vigorous on the record review of rule
11 requirements, but with one omission (i.e., not informing
defendant that he was waiving certain rights that had been
specifically identified).

It included a thorough affidavit, each

paragraph of which defendant initialed, including a paragraph
that clearly advised defendant that he was waiving the specified
rights.

The affidavit was signed in open court by defendant and

certified by the defense attorney and the prosecutor.

The on the

record colloquy and the affidavit, viewed together,
overwhelmingly support a finding that the plea was entered
voluntarily and knowingly and in strict compliance with rule
ll.3

Gibbons and Hoff do not require a different conclusion.

Thus, the court of appeals, in holding that the affidavits cannot
be considered, has decided a question of law in a way that is in
conflict with decisions of this Court; and, even if it can be
argued that the court of appeals' decision does not directly
conflict with Gibbons and Hoff, it constitutes a decisions on an
important question of law which has not been, but should be,
settled by this Court.
Accordingly, certiorari should be granted under either
subsection (b) or subsection (d) of rule 46, Utah Rules of
3

This case does not directly pose the issue of what test
applies on appellate review of the validity of a guilty plea, the
traditional "record as a whole" test or a "strict compliance"
test, which would result in automatic reversal if a trial court
has not strictly complied with rule 11 requirements. That issue
has been addressed in the State's petition for rehearing in State
v. Maquire, No. 900555, filed with this Court on July 23, 1991.
-8-

Appellate Procedure.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this £-1

day of November, 1991.

R. PAUL VAN DAM
Attorney General

JUDITH S.H. ATHERTON
Vjfesistant Attorney General
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that four true and accurate copies of
the foregoing Brief of Appellee were mailed, postage prepaid, to
Sheldon R. Carter, Harris, Carter & Harrison, attorney for
appellant, 3325 N. University Ave, Suite 200, Jamestown Square,
Clocktower Building, Provo, Utah, 84604, this
November, 1991.
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170 Utah Adv. Rep 48

fore, we reverse and remand on the felony
theft conviction issue.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, we affirm the
trial court's denial of the motion for a continuance, and reverse and remand on the felony
theft conviction for proceedings consistent
with this opinion.
Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge
WE CONCUR:
Russell W. Bench, Judge
Norman H. Jackson, Judge
1. Utah Code Ann. §76-6-412(1) (1989) provides:
(1) Theft of property and services as
provided in this chapter shall be punishable:
(b) as a felony of the third degree if
the: (i) value of the property or services
is more than $250 but not more than
$1000;
2. Utah Code Ann. §76-6-412(l)(c) (1989) provides:
(1) Theft of property and services as
provided in this chapter shall be punishable:
(c) as a class A misdemeanor if the
value of the property stolen was more
than $100 but does not exceed $250;

Cite as

170 Utah Adv. Rep. 48
IN T H E
U T A H COURT OF A P P E A L S
STATE of Utah,
Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
Mark Raymond DASTRUP,
Defendant and Appellant.
No. 900144-CA
FILED: September 27, 1991
Sixth District, Sevier County
Honorable Don V. Tibbs
ATTORNEYS:
Shelden R. Carter, Provo, for Appellant
R. Paul Van Dam and Judith S.H. Atherton,
Salt Lake City, for Appellee
Before Judges Bench, Jackson, and Russon.

OPINION
BENCH, Presiding Judge:
Defendant entered a guilty plea to ten
counts of forgery, ail second-degree felonies,
in violation of Utah Code Ann. §76-6-501
(1990), and eight counts of theft, one thirddegree felony and seven second-degree felonies, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §76-6404 (1990). Defendant subsequently attempted
to set aside his guilty plea and resulting conviction by contending that the trial court did
not strictly comply with Rule 11(5) of the
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure as required
by Srare v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309 (Utah
1987). His motion was denied. Defendant now
appeals the denial of his motion to set aside
his guilty plea. We reverse and remand.
When defendant originally entered his guilty
plea, the trial court conducted a colloquy with
defendant on the record regarding his desire to
enter his plea. During that colloquy, the court
addressed each of defendant's constitutional
rights enumerated in Rule 11(5). The trial
court did not, however, ask the defendant on
the record if he knew that by pleading guilty
he was waiving those rights.
Defendant asserts that the trial court's
failure to ask him specifically if he knew that
he was waiving his rights rendered his plea
unacceptable under Rule 1U5).1 Rule 11(5)
provides in pertinent part:
The court ... may not accept the
plea until the court has found:
(c) the defendant knows he has
rights against compulsory selfincrimination, to a jury trial, and to
confront and cross-examine in
open court the witnesses against
him, and that by entering the plea
he waives all of those rights;
Utah R. Crim. P. 11(5) (emphases added).
Defendant makes this claim even though in his
affidavit he affirmatively acknowledged that
he knew he was waiving each of his rights
enumerated in Rule 1 l(5)(c).
Recently, this court held in Srare v. Smith,
812 P.2d 470,477 (Utah App.), petition for cert,
filed, 167 Utah Adv. Rep. 25 (Utah
1991), and State v. Trujillo-Martinez, 162
Utah Adv. Rep. 64 (Utah App. 1991), that a
trial court could consider both the colloquy and
the affidavit in determining whether the
defendant's plea was being entered in strict
compliance with Rule 11(5).2 Subsequently,
however, the Utah Supreme Court's decision
in State v. Hoff, 164 Utah Adv. Rep. 21
(Utah 1991) seems to have foreclosed that
interpretation. In Hoff, the supreme court
stated that Gibbons requires that the trial
court "personally establish[] that the defendant's guilty plea is truly knowing and volu-
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ntary," and that the trial court "establish on
the record that the defendant knowingly
waived his or her constitutional rights and
understood the elements of the crime." Hoff,
164 Utah Adv. Rep. at 22. Even though the
affidavit in this case clearly and unequivocally
states that the defendant has knowingly
waived his constitutional rights, there is no
such statement "on the record." Given the
language in Hoff, the trial court must base its
findings solely on the colloquy, without considering any statements made in the affidavit.
Although the better approach may be to
consider the colloquy and the affidavit in
unison since both constitute evidence properly
before the court, the supreme court has precluded us from taking such an approach. We
are therefore constrained to hold that the plea
was defective because the trial court failed to
address specifically with the defendant, in
open court and "on the record," each and
e\er> provision of Rule 11(5). We must do so
c\en though the defendant affirmatively stated
in his affidavit that he knew he was waiving
his rights.
We reverse the trial court's denial of defendant's motion to set aside his guilty plea and
remand to the trial court for further proceedings consistent herewith.
Russell W. Bench, Presiding Judge
1 CONCUR:
Norman H. Jackson, Judge
1 Defendant also claims that his guilty plea was not
voluntary, and that he did not understand the
nature and elements of the offenses to which he
pleaded guilty. Inasmuch as we reverse because of
the trial court's failure to specifically address each
and every provision of Rule ll(5)(c) with the defendant on the record, we need not consider these
allegations of error.
2 Rule 11(5) does not mandate any colloquy "on
the record." In fact, no such colloquy is ever mentioned in Rule 11(5). Strict compliance with the rule,
therefore, only requires that there be evidence
before the trial court to support each of the findings
enumerated. This is the underlying reasoning of
both Smith and Trujillo-Martincz. The requirement that the findings be based upon statements
nude by the defendant "on the record" during a
colloquy and not upon statements made in an affidavit is a requirement created by the supreme court
io Gibbons. In other words, there are two requirements arising out of Gibbons: first, that there be
compliance with the provisions of Rule 11(5), Gibkwj, 740 P.2d at 1313; and second, that the
trial court conduct an adequate colloquy with the
defendant on the record before accepting the plea. Id.
w
1314. It is therefore logically inappropriate to
aate that the failure to conduct an adequate collOQ"> is a failure to comply strictly with Rule 11(5).
Tbe failure to conduct an adequate colloquy is corjwly characterized as a violation of the common
»* rule established in Gibbons.

RUSSON, Judge (concurring):
1 concur with the majority opinion, but
write separately to express my reservations
concerning the approach recently taken by the
Utah Supreme Court in State v. Hoff, 164
Utah Adv. Rep. 21 (Utah 1991), and Srare v.
Maguire, 164 Utah Adv. Rep. 26 (Utah 1991)
(per curiam). In Hoff and Maguire, the court
extended State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309
(Utah 1987), to require that all of the elements
of Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(5)3 be
expressly addressed in the plea colloquy,
without regard to whether they are present in
the affidavit. For the reasons set out in the
majority opinion in State v. TrujilloManinez, 162 Utah Adv. Rep. 64 (Utah App.
1991), and in my concurring opinion in State
v. Smith, 812 P.2d 470, 481-82 (Utah App.
1991) (Russon, J., concurring), petition for cert.
filed, 167 Utah Adv. Rep. 25 (Utah
1991), both the affidavit and the colloquy
should be used to assist a trial court in ascertaining on the record that a defendant's plea
is truly knowingly and voluntarily made in
compliance with Rule 11. Accordingly, I write
separately to re-emphasize the points raised
in Trujillo-Martinez and Smith.
When used properly, the affidavit is an
effective, as well as efficient, tool to aid the
judge in ascertaining that a plea is, indeed,
knowing and voluntary. The necessity of using
an affidavit in conjunction with a thorough
colloquy is readily apparent:
There is nothing sacrosanct about
an exchange between a trial judge
and a criminal defendant at the
time of taking a guilty plea. A
guilty plea is most often received in
a crowded courtroom with the
defendant, often in shackles,
looking up at a judge who, in black
robe, peers down from an elevated
bench. The judge questions the
defendant while everyone in the
courtroom watches and waits.
Silence in such environment can be
d e a f e n i n g , and the pressure
immense. The situation impels the
defendant to immediately answer
the judge's questions.
However, where an affidavit is
used, the defendant has privacy and
time to prepare, review, and discuss
the affidavit with his lawyer. No
one is watching and waiting. There
are no time limitations. The defendant has the opportunity to ask his
lawyer the meaning of certain words
and phrases. Consequently, there is
more assurance of a knowing and
voluntary plea when an affidavit is
utilized than when it is not. Of
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course, the trial judge must still be
satisfied, by personal inquiry of the
defendant, that the defendant actually read the affidavit, reviewed it
with counsel, and understands it.
Smith, 812 P.2d at 481 (Russon, J., concurring). Thus, proper use of an affidavit in
conjunction with the colloquy promotes the
trial judge's ability to determine that a.plea
was knowingly made by the defendant, thus
producing a guilty plea which is less susceptible to reversal on appeal.
Additionally, the use of affidavits in conjunction with the colloquy also ensures that the
taking of guilty pleas is performed efficiently.
The extent of the colloquy will then depend
upon the needs of the defendant:
A defendant who is a college graduate and who informs the judge
that he has read his affidavit, discussed it with his attorney, and
understands it will naturally not
require the kind of inquiry as will a
defendant who has no education
and little or no grasp of the English
language.
Id. at 481-82. Thus, efficiency is also served
without sacrificing the criminal defendant's
rights.
However, the trial court's responsibility
does not end with finding that the affidavit
and colloquy together establish a knowing and
voluntary plea. The trial court must also
inquire as to whether the defendant has read
and understands his affidavit, and whether he
has discussed it with his attorney, in order for
the judge to properly ascertain that such affidavit was both knowingly and voluntarily
signed. If the trial court does not so question
the defendant, such affidavit cannot be used
because of the lack of evidence that defendant
is in any way familiar with the terms of the
affidavit. However, in cases where the judge
does sufficiently question the defendant about
his affidavit, the affidavit should be permitted
to cover any gaps in the colloquy.
In Trujillo-Martinez, the trial court asked
the defendant, "Have you gone over an affidavit with your attorney?," and "Do you
understand the contents of that document?"
Trujillo-Martinez, 162 Utah Adv. Rep. at 65.
Both questions were answered in the affirmative. By doing so, the trial court was able to
ascertain that Trujillo-Martinez had knowingly signed his affidavit. Furthermore, TrujilloMartinez testified that his plea was voluntarily
made. Id. Likewise, in Smith, the trial court
ascertained that the plea was knowingly and
voluntarily made. Smith, 812 P.2d at 478-79.
On the other hand, in Hoff, there is no indication that any attempt was made by the trial
court to establish that Hoff had read and
understood his affidavit. Thus, even if the
court had used the approach of considering
UTAH ADVA

the affidavit and colloquy in concert, the
affidavit would have to be excluded.
Similarly, in the case at bar, the trial
court's failure to adequately question Dastrup
as to his knowledge and understanding of his
affidavit requires reversal. There is no question that Dastrup's affidavit strictly complied
with all of the Rule 11 elements. However, the
plea colloquy at Dastrup's plea hearing was
insufficient:
THE COURT: Is your true and
correct name Mark Raymond
Dastrup?
DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. It is.
THE COURT: How far did you go
through school?
DEFENDANT: Through grade 12,
high school.
THE COURT: Do you read and
write the English language?
DEFENDANT: Yes.
THE COURT: Have you had an
opportunity to talk with your attorney this morning?
DEFENDANT: Yes.
THE COURT: Do you need any
additional time to talk to him
before I go forward with this arraignment?
DEFENDANT: No.
THE COURT: Are you under the
influence of alcohol or narcotics or
suffering any mental illness?
DEFENDANT: No.
[At this time a copy of the
Amended Information was given to
defendant's counsel and read to
defendant.]
THE COURT: Now Mr. Dastrup,
it's my duty to advise you of your
constitutional rights, advise you of
the consequence of the matter
before the court, make sure you
understand them, and it's my duty
to obtain a voluntary plea from
you. So listen to me carefully, and
if you have any questions, don't
hesitate to stop me and I'll answer
them.
[Defendant's charges were read to
him.]
You have certain constitutional
rights in this court. First, you're
entitled to be represented by an
attorney at every step in the proceedings, and you're represented by
Mr. Hunt at this time.
You're entitled to a speedy trial
by an impartial jury. You're entitled to confront and have your
attorney cross examine in open
court any witnesses that appear
against you. You have a privilege
against compulsory self incriminaREPORTS
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tion. That means you don't have to
testify, if you don't desire to. You
may stand mute and say nothing
and the burden's still upon the
State of Utah to prove you guilty,
beyond a reasonable doubt. Likewise, if you desire to testify, you
have that right.
You have a right to compulsory
process for obtaining witnesses in
your defense. At the time of trial it
requires a unanimous verdict by the
jury to convict you, and if you are
convicted, you have the right to
appeal the conviction to the Court
of Appeals of the State of Utah.
Now these are basically your
constitutional rights. Mr. Hunt,
have you advised him of these
rights?
DEFENSE COUNSEL: I have your
Honor.
THE COURT: In your opinion,
does he understand them?
DEFENSE COUNSEL: I believe so.
THE COURT: Do you have any
questions you'd like to ask me, Mr.
Dastrup?
DEFENDANT: No. I don't believe
so.
[The terms of the plea agreement
were explained.]
THE COURT: Now Mr. Dastrup,
counsel has indicated a plea bargain
and the only way I'll accept this
plea bargain is on the basis that you
admit that you actually committed
the forgeries and theft that you've
been charged with and admit the
allegations as set forth in the
Amended Information on each of
the particular facts. That's the only
way 1*11 do it. I don't want somebody coming in and pleading in my
court to something that they didn't
do. Do you understand that?
DEFENDANT: Yes.
THE COURT: And likewise, I've
instructed the State's Attorney in
these kinds of cases I want the statement signed by the defendant in
writing, and a plea agreement. I
assume you have that.
PROSECUTION: We do, your
Honor.
THE COURT: And I would insist
that that likewise be executed in
open court and that you initial each
one of the paragraphs involved. I
assume your attorney has advised
you of that, Mr. Dastrup.
DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: Now, you want me
to accept this plea bargain then at
this time, Mr. Dastrup?
UTAH ADVA

DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: Now Mr. Dastrup,
do you admit that you committed
the forgeries, as set forth in the
amended information, and committed the thefts on the dates, as set
forth in the amended information?
DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
[Agreement was executed by defendant and counsel.]
THE COURT: Now, let me just
explain one other thing, Mr.
Dastrup, before you sign this. This
court takes the position as to what
a person is charged with, that's up
to the State of Utah to determine.
In other words, the court doesn't
make charges against anyone, so
that's a matter for the State of
Utah to determine. When it gets to
the penalty phase of the case, then
that's for the court to determine.
That's not for counsel. So while I
hear recommendations concerning
the penalty phase, I'm the one
that's going to have to make that
determination. You've advised him
of that Mr. Hunt?
DEFENSE COUNSEL: I have,
your Honor.
THE COURT: And you understand
that, Mr. Dastrup?
DEFENDANT: Yes. I believe so.
THE COURT: Thank you. The
record should indicate that the
court accepts the plea bargain.
The record should indicate that
Mr. Dastrup has executed in open
court a statement of the defendant
concerning these offenses. I would
like him to initial each one of these
paragraphs, counsel.
The court's of the opinion that
the defendant has been advised of
his constitutional rights, the consequence of the matter before the
court. The court's of the opinion
that he intelligently understands
why he's here and that his plea is
voluntary, and the court approves
the plea bargain, as set forth by
counsel.
Although the trial court even went so far as
to have Dastrup initial each provision in his
affidavit, there was no indication during the
colloquy that Dastrup had read and understood what he was initialing. In such circumstances, we have no choice but to hold that the
trial court failed to adequately question
Dastrup before concluding that Dastrup's plea
was knowingly and voluntarily made. Therefore, even using the approach of considering
the affidavit and colloquy in concert, I agree
REPORTS
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that this case must be reversed and remanded.
As recently as State v. Smith, 111 P.2d 464
(Utah 1989), the Utah Supreme Court has
agreed with this approach, looking at both the
affidavit and colloquy in reaching its determination that Smith's guilty plea was not knowingly and voluntarily made. Id. at 466.
However, Hoff and Maguire go beyond this
result and effectively eliminate the usefulness
of affidavits in the taking of a guilty plea. Hoff
extends the strict compliance rule of Gibbons to
require that the judge "establish on the record
that the d e f e n d a n t
knowingly
waived his or her constitutional rights and
understood the elements of the crime." Hoff,
164 Utah Adv. Rep. at 22 (emphasis added).
In so holding, the Utah Supreme Court now
requires rote recitation of all of the Rule 11
elements in the colloquy, without regard to
whether they are specified in the affidavit.
Requiring rote recitation of Rule 11 requirements effectively destroys the positive
aspects of using an affidavit in conjunction
with the colloquy. There is no longer an
impetus for parties to prepare a thorough
affidavit if the affidavit is to be ignored at the
time of the taking of the plea. Moreover, with
rote recitation becoming the rule, a new
avenue to appeal the taking of guilty pleas
opens. Now, despite the fact that the defendant orally waives all of his rights and says
that he has done so knowingly and voluntarily, defense counsel can argue that his client
felt pressured to say so or the procedure was a
mere formality, and hence the judge did not
actually ascertain whether such waiver was,
indeed, knowing and voluntary. All of this can
be avoided if an affidavit is used in concert
with a thorough colloquy which includes
questions as to defendant's understanding of
his affidavit.
Accordingly, I concur, but with the above
reservations.
Leonard H. Russon, Judge
1. Rule 11(5) provides:
The court may refuse to accept a plea of
guilty or no contest, and may not accept
the plea until the court has found:
(a) if the defendant is not represented
by counsel, he has knowingly waived his
right to counsel and does not desire
counsel;
(b) the plea is voluntarily made;
(c) the defendant knows he has rights
against compulsory self-incrimination,
to a jury trial, and to confront and crossexamine in open court the witnesses
against him, and that by entering the
plea he waives all of those rights;
(d) the defendant understands the
nature and elements of the offense to
which be is entering the plea; that upon
trial the prosecution would have the
burden of proving each of those dements beyond a reasonable doubt; and
UTAH A

that the plea is an admission of ali those
elements;
(e) the defendant knows the minimum
and maximum sentence that may be
imposed upon him for each offense to
which a plea is entered, including the
possibility of the imposition of consecutive sentences;
(0 if the tendered plea is a result of a
prior plea discussion and plea agreement, and if so, what agreement has
been reached; and
(g) the defendant, has been advised of
the time limits for filing any motion to
withdraw a plea of guilty or no contest.

Cite as

170 Utah Adv. Rep. 52
IN T H E
U T A H COURT OF A P P E A L S
RALPH L. WADSWORTH
CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, INC.,
Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
SALT LAKE COUNTY, a political
subdivision of the State of Utah; R. P.
Holds worth, Director, The Salt Lake County
Flood Control Division,
Defendants and Appellants.
No. 900234-CA
FILED: September 30, 1991
Third District, Salt Lake County
Honorable James S. Sawaya
ATTORNEYS:
David E. Yocom and Jeffrey H. Thorpe, Salt
Lake City, for Appellant
Wilford A. Beesley and Stanford P. Fitts, Salt
Lake City, for Appellee
Before Judges Bench, Jackson, and Orme.
OPINION
BENCH, Presiding Judge:
Ralph L. Wadsworth Construction
Company, Inc. (Wadsworth) was the unsuccessful bidder on a public works project in Salt
Lake County (the County) and sued for
damages on contract and negligence theories.
The trial court awarded Wadsworth damages
for lost profits on a motion for summary
judgment and the County appealed. We
reverse and remand.
I. FACTS
On July 8, 1985, the County invited competitive, sealed bids by advertisement for construction of the Scott Avenue Basin flood
control project on Millcreek. The bid advertREPORTS
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVIER JUDICIAL DISTRICT
STATE OF UTAH
HE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

STATEMENT OF DEFENDANT

vs.
Criminal No.

ARK DASTRUP,

I/C-'~

Defendant.

COMES NOW, Mark Dastrup, the Defendant in this case and hereby
cknowledges and certifies the following:
I have entered a plea of guilty to the following crime(s):
<'ful»
10 counts of Forgery, a second degree felony, punishable
y a prison term of 1 to 15 years in the state prison and a fine
f $10 000 00

' -

Ic^sU^cW^U^

8 counts of Theft ^ a third degree relony, punishable by<J>c^u^
prison term of up to 5 years in the state prison and s fine of T^HJ5,000.00.
-1W I have received a copy of the information against me, I have
ead it, and I understand the nature and elements of the offense(s)
or which I am pleading guilty.
, ^ T h e elements of the crime(s) of which I am charged are as
ollows: That on the dates set forth in the information I signed
name on a check other than my own. Further, that on the dates
s set forth on the information I obtained control of money
belonging to another with the intent to deprive the owner of said
loney.
y My conduct, and the conduct of other persons for which I am
~PIAJ2.

criminally liable, that constitutes the elements of the crime(s)
charged are as follows: That I signed the name of another person
to a check and obtained money without the owner's permission.
surf I am entering this/these plea(s) voluntarily and with
knowledge and understanding of the following facts:
Hv0 1.
I know that I have the right to be represented by an
attorney and that if I cannot afford one, an attorney will be
appointed by the Court at no cost to me,
>^ 2.
I have not waived my right to counsel.
^ 3.
If I have waived my right to counsel, I have read this
statement and understand the nature and elements of the charges,
my rights in this and other proceedings and the consequences of my
plea of guilty.
/^ 4.
I have not waived my right to counsel, my attorney is
Lawrence H. Hunt, and I have had an opportunity to discuss this
statement, my rights and the consequences of my guilty plea with
my attorney.
***J 5.
I know that I have a right to a trial by jury.
-;•«>. 6.
I know that if I wish to have a trial I have the right
to confront and cross-examine witnesses against me or to have them
cross-examine witnesses against me or to have them cross-examined
by my attorney. I also know that I have the right to have my
witnesses subpoenaed at State expense to testify in Court upon my
behalf.
-4>uj; ?•
* know that I have a right to testify in my own behalf
but if I choose not to do so I can not be compelled to testify or
give evidence against myself and no adverse inferences will be
drawn against me if I do not testify.
«*t0 8.
I know that if I wish to contest the charge against me
I need only plead "not guilty" and the matter will be set for
trial, at which time the State of Utah will have the burden of
proving each element of the charge beyond a reasonable doubt. If
the trial is before a jury the verdict must be unanimous.
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~fe*? 9.
I know that under the Constitution of Utah that if I were
ried and convicted by a jury or by the Judge that I would have the
ight to appeal my conviction and sentence to the Utah Court of
ppeals or, where allowed, to the Supreme Court of Utah and that
f I could not afford to pay the costs for such appeal, those costs
ould be paid by the State*
^10.
I know that the maximum possible sentence may be imposed
pon my plea of guilty, and that sentence may be for a prison term,
ine, or both.
I know that in addition to any fine, a 25%
urcharge, required by Utah Code Annotated 63-63-9, will be
mposed. I also know that I may be ordered by the Court to make
estitution to any victim or victims of my crimes.
^11.
I know that imprisonment may be for consecutive periods,
r the fine for additional amounts, if my plea is to be more than
ne charge. I also know that if I am on probation, parole or
waiting sentencing on another offense of which I have been
onvicted or to which I have pleaded guilty, my plea in the present
ction may result in consecutive sentences being imposed upon me.
^ 12.
I know and understand that by pleading guilty I am
aiving my statutory and constitutional rights set out in the
^receding paragraphs. I also know that by entering such plea(s)
am admitting and do so admit that I have committed the conduct
lleged and I am guilty of the crime(s) for which my plea(s) is/are
mtered.
*t*7 13.
My plea(s) of guilty is/are not the result of a plea
bargain between myself and the prosecuting attorney, the promises,
luties and provisions of this plea bargain, if any, are fully
contained in the Plea Agreement attached to this Affidavit.
7^14.
I know that any charge or sentencing concession or
•ecommendation of probation or suspended sentence, including a
-eduction of the charges for sentencing made or sought by either
lefense counsel or the prosecuting attorney are not binding on the
rudge. I also know that any opinions they express to me as to what
;hey believe the Court may do are also not binding on the Court.

3

-2^15. No threats, coercion, or unlawful influence of any kind
have been made to induce me to plead guilty, and no promises,
except those contained herein and in the attached plea agreement,
have been made to me.
-*,^16.
I have read this statement, or I have had it read to me
by my attorney, and I understand its provisions. I know that I am
free to change or delete anything contained in this Affidavit. I
do not wish to make any changes because all of the statements are
correct.
~ryutfl7.
I am satisfied with the advice and assistance of my
attorney.
/fajlB.
I am y C» years of age; I have attended school through
the
}T**
grade and I can read and understand the English
language. I was not under the influence of any drugs, medication
or intoxicants when the decision to enter the plea(s) was made.
I am not presently under the influence of any drugs, medication or
intoxicants.
~fU# 19.
I believe myself to be of a sound and discerning mind,
mentally capable of understanding the proceedings and the
consequences of my plea and free of any mental disease, defect or
impairment that would prevent me from knowingly, intelligently and
voluntarily entering my plea.
DATED this " 7

day of March, 1989.

-vyla*£
MARK DASTRUP
DEFENDANT
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